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ABSTRACT: The present article proposes some reflections on the issue of “how to rule” 
as crucial to think about politics in terms of limits on government and thus in terms 
of preservation of fundamental freedoms. By referring to some of the most prominent 
thinkers of European Liberalism, the article examines the principle of “how to rule” in 
relation to that of “who rules” in order to stress how just the latter can imply – if isolated 
from the former – potentially dangerous elements for the guarantee of a free and civic 
coexistence. In the last part, the article recognizes the relevance of Liberal-democratic 
tradition of thought as a compromise between the two principles.
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ALGUMAS REFLEXÕES SOBRE A IMPORTÂNCIA DE “COMO GOVERNAR”
RESUMO: O presente artigo propõe algumas reflexões sobre a questão de “como governar” 
como cruciais para pensar a política em termos de limites ao governo e, portanto, em ter-
mos de preservação das liberdades fundamentais. Ao se referir a alguns dos pensadores mais 
proeminentes do liberalismo europeu, o artigo examina o princípio de “como governar” em 
relação ao de “quem governa” para enfatizar como apenas o último pode implicar - se isolado 
do primeiro - elementos potencialmente perigosos para a garantia de uma coexistência livre 
e cívica. Na última parte, o artigo reconhece a relevância da tradição liberal-democrática 
do pensamento como um compromisso entre os dois princípios.
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In “Animal Farm” the British, Socialist journalist and writer George 
Orwell presented a brilliant and ferocious critique of Stalinism and the betrayed 
promise of a new society made up of truly free and equal men and women. The 
story is well known: the animals of a farm decide to revolt against their cruel 
and brutal master, to live according to the noble principles of Socialism. Just 
those principles will however be destroyed by the pigs – and precisely by the 
pig named Napoleon – who will finally impose a personal dictatorship in which 
“all animals are equal but some are more equal than others”, where Socialist 
principles and hopes will be reduced to a mere and empty phraseology for pro-
paganda (ORWELL, 2004). There is extensive literature on the meaning of this 
fascinating 20th century political fable. Orwell’s objective was to make an allegory 
of the perverse effects of Stalinism and then of how that regime had literally 
abandoned any principle of freedom and respect for the most elementary rules of 
civic coexistence. In other words, Orwell’s merit would be to launch a powerful 
invective against Stalinian totalitarianism (NEWSINGER, 1999). 
Yet, personally I decided to start from Orwell’s novel for another reason. I 
think that “Animal Farm” – especially when the pigs rise to power legitimating 
their leadership in the name of Socialist principles – shows us the peril of a view 
of political power, which is mostly focused on the problem of “who rules” rather 
than on “how to rule”. For the animals of the Farm, the main challenge is to 
chase the cruel farmer away and establish a new kind of order. The key to that 
change is just to replace the human master with new leaders who legitimate their 
rule on the basis of the victorious rebellion and in the name of noble ideals. Yet, 
once the new leadership is established, the situation soon degenerates because – 
among the many reasons for that – the elimination of the cruel human master 
and the rise of the smart pigs claiming to embody the true values of the animal 
revolution are considered per se the fulfillment of the revolution. For the rebel-
ling animals the problem of “how to rule” seems to be of secondary importance. 
Moving from the example of Orwell’s “Animal Farm” to political theo-
ry, there is an important tradition of thought which instead, has always con-
sidered the issue of “how to rule” central to political life and dynamics, i.e. 
Liberalism. By that I am referring to a century-long school of thought which 
takes shape in John Locke’s Two Treatises on Government, develops through-
out the Enlightenment and the 19th century, the cradle of so-called Classical 
Liberalism, which experiences a tragic crisis in the early post war period and re-
flourishes during the second half of the 20th century thanks to thinkers such as 
John Rawls and Richard Dworkin, just to mention some internationally popular 
intellectuals. 
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Defining the meaning of Liberalism is complex: Liberalism refers in the 
first instance to a series of “ideas and values” which primarily involve individual 
freedom, individual dignity, social progress, tolerance, respect for other’s opin-
ions as well as referring to concrete political movements and most importantly to 
a specific kind of society, called Liberal society (WALL, 2015). In this essay I will 
refer to Liberalism in one of its (for me) most important political implications 
and meanings: Liberalism as that political doctrine reflecting and investigating 
the problem of how to rule while respecting individual freedom. This is one of the 
long-term components of Liberalism as a tradition of thought: already evident 
within John Locke, Charles de Montesquieu, and Immanuel Kant’s political 
theories. For the British thinker – whose Two Treatises of the Government is con-
sidered as the “manifesto” of the transformation of the British monarchy into a 
constitutional monarchy (1689) – the government had the duty to protect indi-
viduals’ natural rights through Law. By that, Locke meant that any government 
violating such a duty (which was both a moral and political obligation) would 
be tyrannical (LOCKE, 1982). The problem of government, which had to act 
within certain limits, was crucial for Kant too and Montesquieu formalized this 
by elaborating two core principles. With the first principle, Montesquieu argued 
that the fundamental difference between Monarchy and Republic, on the one 
hand, and despotism on the other was that the former acted within the respect 
of the Law, i.e. within the respect of the principle of Legality. On the contrary, 
despotism was marked by the sentiment of fear just because it acted beyond any 
kind of limit. With the second principle – which was logically related to the pre-
vious one – Montesquieu stated that the concentration of the three main powers 
into the hands of one single subject/institution was to be avoided and that a 
government capable of granting fundamental freedoms was one established on 
the separation of powers and a check and balance system (MONTESQUIEU, 
2007). Montesquieu’s political theory remained a reference point for all 19th 
century European Liberals who – as in particular Benjamin Constant – were 
particularly concerned about the issue of posing stringent limits on governments, 
to avoid violations of fundamental individual rights. This concern emerged again 
from the works of thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill 
and it never perished although just these two – differently from the Liberal 
thinkers previously mentioned – embraced the principle of extending the right 
to vote to all citizens beyond social/class distinctions. On theoretical level, it 
was thanks to Tocqueville’ and Mill’s work that there was the “encounter” – in 
terms of political theory – between Liberalism and democratic tradition, which 
had been separated, and in reciprocal antagonism, so far. More precisely, it was 
144 Rev. Cadernos de Campo | Araraquara | n. 28 | p. 141-147 | jan./jun. 2020 | E-ISSN 2359-2419
Some reflections on the importance of ‘how to rule”
the “encounter” of a tradition of thought concentrated on the issue of “how to 
rule” with another tradition classically committed to identifying the people with 
the true ruler of a true democratic government. Both Tocqueville and Mill thus 
gave a crucial contribution to the development of Liberal-Democratic thought 
(CONSTANT, 2016; TOCQUEVILLE, 2010; MILL, 1999). 
Between the mid-19th century and the mid-20th century – i.e. before the 
rise of totalitarian regimes in the very heart of Europe – one of the clearest 
expressions of a Liberal concept of government and political power was the 
aftermath of the so-called Rechtsstaat (“rule of Law”) system. According to the 
latter, there must be clear principles established by Law according to which a 
community is ruled and which the government itself must respect (COSTA; 
ZOLO, 2007). The massive crisis involving the major European Liberal and 
parliamentary democracies during the first post-war period as well as the rise 
of totalitarian ideologies seemed to bury Liberalism, which however reemerged 
in the second post war period, for example thanks to the authors of the so 
called Cold War Liberalism (Karl Popper, Raymond Aaron, Isaiah Berlin, Jacob 
Talmon). Against the Totalitarian tragedy, they emphasized the issue of “how 
to rule” within democratic systems, in order to understand which limits the 
government could not violate (MUELLER, 2008).
One of the most frequent and popular critiques to Liberalism’s concern for 
“how to rule” is the fact that it would overestimate the importance of individual 
freedoms and would underestimate equally relevant rights such as social ones. 
Also, it would underestimate the problem by which freedom remains an empty 
word for those living in poverty or who are socially and economically mar-
ginalized. Chiefly for those starting from a Marxist argumentation, Liberalism 
and Liberal-democratic theory with their attention for individual freedoms, for 
“how to rule”, would be nothing but the expression of the bourgeois political 
and social view. This critique is acceptable but it seems to ignore two important 
elements: in historical terms, Liberalism has not only “encountered” democracy 
by embracing the principle of people’s suffrage but also it has moved closer to 
traditions of thought such as Socialism, while showing a growing concern for 
social issues. In 20th century Europe, prominent intellectuals such as the Italian 
Carlo Rosselli, elaborated a Liberal Socialism, a theory which saw Socialism as 
the ultimate and highest realization of Liberalism. Rosselli observed in fact how 
social justice and the emancipation of the working class would fail without the 
provision of fundamental freedoms and the respect of the individual. In Britain 
Leonard T. Hobhouse advocated a liberal and democratic kind of society, while 
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trying to conciliate the principle of individual freedom with the demands of 
a more equal and just social order (ROSSELLI, 2009; HOBHOUSE, 2009).
Regardless of the very personal opinion one might have on this tradition 
of political thought, among the many principles established, Liberalism and the 
Liberal-Democratic tradition argue that politics and most importantly the prob-
lem of organizing a modern, civic and progressive kind of political and social 
order cannot be univocally identified and reduced to the problem of “who rules”. 
The latter must be taken into account in relation to “how to rule” and therefore 
to the concrete challenge of establishing limits to the government and those 
representing it. Liberal intuition about the relevance of such aspect in my opin-
ion is useful, to interpret some aspects of past and present political situations. 
Think about the emergence of totalitarian regimes and ideologies in the 
first post-war Europe. Obviously as we all know there is a variety of different rea-
sons and factors behind that rise. However, in general terms, one cannot ignore 
that one of the key factors behind the totalitarian (Fascist and Nazi) success was 
precisely the ability to move political debate and even people’s expectations from 
the “how to rule” to “who rules” or better to “the one who should rule”. Scholars 
have stressed how the development and consolidation of mass democracies and 
mass parties had contributed to create the perfect condition for the assertion of 
ideologies and political parties based on the leadership of one single charismatic 
figure (ARENDT, 2009). There is much truth in that. Yet, what really interests 
me is rather to highlight that the assertion of those figures leading political par-
ties with clear anti-Liberal and anti-democratic programs implied exactly that 
the loss of trust in the importance of “how to rule” in favor of “who rules”, i.e. in 
favor of a political vision which practically identified one figure, one party, one 
ideology as the right one to solve the ongoing crisis. The “who” became more 
important than the “how” both in Fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany. Faced 
with the “biennio rosso” – the massive wave of social and economic protests led 
by workers and peasants through North and Central-North Italy – and political 
instability, the “who” was Mussolini who promised order, safety and the restora-
tion of social peace, although the “how” of his rule concretely consisted in the 
elimination of political and party pluralism. In Germany, after the long-running 
instability of the Weimar Republic, the “who” was Hitler who promised order, 
safety, the vindication of the Versailles humiliation, although the “how” of his 
rule implied the establishing of a totalitarian power. 
Now I would like to bring your attention back to the present day. Looking 
in particular to the political context I know best, the European one, recent 
years have witnessed the emergence and development of populist movements, 
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of different nationalities. European populism is a complex phenomenon which 
should also be considered in the light of the weakness of the European Union, 
its egoisms, its being a monetary union rather than a true political entity based 
on a true European identity and a true sentiment of solidarity. The way in which 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis was treated and – more recently – the reactions of 
some European countries to the pandemic problem are an example of that. Yet, 
in my perspective, populism is an expression just of some potentially dangerous 
implications of the “who rules” principle. Populism appeals to “the people” as 
if it were a homogeneous entity. It advocates the necessity to make the people – 
and more precisely ordinary people – effectively rule. Its focus is, in my opinion, 
again and primarily on the issue of “who rules” rather than on “how to rule”. 
There is nothing wrong per se in advocating the principle of the people’s rule. 
The true problem is the specific way populism conceives just this supposed 
unitary entity called the people, i.e. as a sort of monolithic subject in which 
the “diverse” have almost no room, in which the “foreign” is per se a threat, and 
which opposes, with anger, the “élite” seen as an unbearably privileged group. 
Hence a strong Leader capable of establishing a direct communication with it, 
is necessary (URBINATI, 2019). 
The latter aspect illuminates us on another controversial implication of a 
political concept entirely focused on the problem of “who rules”. If – as Isaiah 
Berlin correctly argued in his works – one reduces politics to this single issue, 
once established who “the ruler” is, any other issue or problem – like for example 
the protection of minorities or concrete limits to pose to the government – risks 
becoming of secondary importance, especially if the “ruler” is provided with 
some “salvific mission” and if the primary political relationship is conceived that 
between the “ruler” and the “people” (BERLIN, 1969). 
Berlin’s intuition – which (in reality) came from Benjamin Constant – 
might be considered a bit extreme but it contains an element of truth, especially 
if applied to illiberal ideologies of different intensity and danger. With that I 
don’t want to argue that the problem of “how to rule” is more important or 
noble than the problem of “who rules”. In history – as I was previously arguing – 
Liberal-democratic tradition has emerged as an attempt to find a balance and 
a lasting compromise between the two. I have rather tried to recall attention to 
the centrality of the former and the importance of nurturing a political culture 
and mentality, which can be aware of the importance of the limits to power 
not only in the name of individual freedoms but also in also in the name of the 
preservation of democratic institutions. 
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